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HILLARY: THE MOVIE
CORPORATE FREE SPEECH OR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE
CORRUPTION?
AARON HARMON*

I. INTRODUCTION
“I like the smell of a dunged field, and the tumult of a popular
1
election.”

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission concerns a law
designed to lessen what some congresspersons perceived to be the
“dunged field” smell caused by the spate of political attack
advertisements that typically precede popular elections.2 To improve
the electoral aroma, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign
3
Reform Act (“BCRA”) of 2002, which broadly banned corporatefunded political advertising in certain periods leading up to a federal
election.4 But in plowing under the field of corporate-funded political
advertising, Congress unearthed the stronger stench of
unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of speech.
Citizens United (“Citizens”), a nonprofit advocacy corporation
that produces political documentaries, filed suit in December 2007
against the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) seeking a
preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of certain

* 2009 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. AUGUSTUS WILLIAM HARE & JULIUS CHARLES HARE, GUESSES AT TRUTH 198 (New
York, MacMillian 1889).
2. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S10208-02, S10209 (1997) (remarks of Sen. Boxer) (“These
so-called issue[] ads are not regulated at all and mention candidates by name. They directly
attack candidates without any accountability. It is brutal. . . . We have an opportunity in the
McCain-Feingold bill to stop that . . . .”).
3. McCain-Feingold Campaign-Finance Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
4. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2) (West 2009).
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provisions of the BCRA.5 Citizens was preparing to distribute its
critical biography of then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton,
Hillary: The Movie (“Hillary”), via video on-demand (“VOD”) when
6
it realized that doing so would violate BCRA section 203.
Additionally, Citizens realized advertisements promoting Hillary
would have to comply with the disclosure and disclaimer
7
requirements of BCRA sections 201 and 311.
To comply with the BCRA’s provisions, Citizens would have to
restrict VOD access to Hillary in each state for thirty days prior to the
8
state’s Democratic primary and place a disclaimer on all promotional
advertisements explaining that Citizens was solely responsible for the
advertisements’ content and that no candidate had approved the
9
advertisements. Moreover, Citizens would have to file a report with
the FEC disclosing the names of any donors who had contributed
more than $1,000 to fund Hillary’s production.10 Citizens filed suit in
district court challenging the VOD-distribution ban and the disclosure
11
and disclaimer requirements as unconstitutional speech restrictions.
The district court denied Citizens’s preliminary injunction
12
request. Approximately six months later, the court granted summary
judgment to the FEC13 and held that the BCRA’s prohibition of the
VOD distribution of Hillary and requirement of disclosure and
14
disclaimers were constitutional.
Under a special provision of the BCRA, Citizens appealed
15
directly to the Supreme Court. On November 14, 2008, the Court

5. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n (Citizens United I), 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277
(D.D.C. 2008).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A) (West 2009) (defining cable communications that refer to
a candidate for federal office as “electioneering communications” if they occur within 30 days of
a primary election) and 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (prohibiting corporations from funding
“electioneering communications”).
9. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441d (West 2009).
10. 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(2).
11. Citizens United I, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 (D.D.C. 2008).
12. Id. at 282.
13. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n (Citizens United II), No. 07-2240, 2008 WL
2788753, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008).
14. See id. (granting summary judgment to the FEC based on the reasoning in Citizens
United I, 530 F. Supp. 2d, in which the district court ruled that the BCRA provisions were
constitutional).
15. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a)(3), 116
Stat. 81, 113–14 (giving the Supreme Court authority to hear direct appeals in disputes arising
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noted it had probable jurisdiction to hear the case16 and scheduled
oral argument for March 24, 2009.
Citizens and the FEC dispute two issues. First, can BCRA section
203 constitutionally prohibit the VOD distribution of a feature-length
17
documentary about a candidate in an approaching federal election?
Second, can the FEC constitutionally apply the disclaimer and
disclosure requirements of BCRA sections 201 and 311 to such a
documentary?18
This commentary will address the first issue—whether it is
constitutional to proscribe VOD distribution of a film like Hillary.
The second issue remains an important aspect of campaign finance
law, but it is not explored here.
II. FACTS
Citizens is a nonprofit membership corporation that, in addition to
other forms of advocacy, produces feature-length documentaries that
comport with its political ideology.19 In 2007, Citizens produced
Hillary, a ninety-minute biography that examines Hillary Clinton’s
20
political background in a critical light. The film focuses on five
aspects of Hillary’s political career: firing of certain White House staff
during her husband’s presidency, retaliation against a woman who
accused her husband of sexual harassment, violations of finance
restrictions during her Senate campaign, her husband’s abuse of the
presidential pardon power, and her record on various political issues.21
The documentary contains interviews with famous political
commentators such as Dick Morris, Mark Levin, and Ann Coulter.22
None of these commentators expressly advocate for the defeat of
Hillary Clinton in the interviews, but many express negative opinions
about her character and ability to be an effective president.23
under the BCRA). The Supreme Court’s actual jurisdiction will likely be addressed at oral
argument.
16. Citizens United II, 2008 WL 2788753, prob. juris. noted, 129 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 14, 2008)
(No. 08-205) (mem.).
17. Brief for Appellant at i, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 08-205 (U.S.
filed Jan. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
18. Id.
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n (Citizens United I), 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 280
(D.D.C. 2008).
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Hillary’s production was financed with Citizens’s general treasury
funds.24 Citizens alleged that ninety-nine percent of the $1 million
donated to fund Hillary came from individuals, with the remaining
25
one percent coming from for-profit corporations. The trial record
does not indicate what percentage of Citizens’s general funding comes
from for-profit corporations.26
In January 2008, Citizens released Hillary.27 It was shown in select
theatres in several cities and sold on DVD through Citizens’s website
and commercial retailers.28 In addition, a large VOD provider offered
to make Hillary available through its Elections ’08 VOD feature, an
offer Citizens pursued until learning that such distribution would be
prohibited by BCRA section 203.29 Had Hillary been available on
30
VOD, cable subscribers could have accessed it at any time.
Citizens considered BCRA section 203’s prohibition of Hillary’s
VOD distribution to be an unconstitutional speech restriction but was
unable to obtain a preliminary injunction against section 203’s
enforcement. Not wanting to risk criminal prosecution, Citizens
abstained from showing Hillary through VOD during the Democratic
31
primary season. By the time the district court granted the FEC’s
summary judgment motion six months later, Barack Obama had
secured the Democratic nomination, so Citizens could distribute
Hillary at will.32 Nevertheless, Citizens, likely to face the same BCRA
restrictions on future productions, appealed the district court’s ruling
to the Supreme Court.33 Though it had lost the battle in district court,

24. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 7.
25. Id. at 32–33.
26. Brief for the Appellee at 30, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 08-205
(U.S. filed Feb. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Brief for the Appellee].
27. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 7.
28. Id.
29. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276 (D.D.C. 2008); Brief
for Appellant, supra note 17, at 8-9.
30. Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 25.
31. See id. at 37–38 (arguing that the BCRA required Citizens to either “risk felony
prosecution” or “remain silent”).
32. After Barack Obama secured the Democratic nomination, Hillary Clinton was no
longer a candidate in a federal election, so the BCRA would not have applied to Hillary at that
point. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A) et seq. (West 2009) (specifying that the BCRA only
regulates electioneering communications, which, by definition, must refer to a candidate in a
federal election).
33. See Brief for the Appellee, supra note 16, at 14 n.3 (noting that Citizens’ future
productions will likely be subject to the BCRA).
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prevailing in the Supreme Court would win the war for future
election periods.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The BCRA regulates the area of speech defined as
34
“electioneering communications.” An electioneering communication
is “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that refers to a
candidate for the federal office contested in a primary or general
election and is made within thirty days before a primary election or
sixty days before a general election.35
More specifically, section 203 of the BCRA, which amended the
Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) of 1971,36 prohibits
corporations from funding electioneering communications with
general treasury funds.37 Congress enacted FECA to lessen the actual
and apparent corruption of elected officials by large campaign
contributions by imposing limits on direct contributions to a federal
candidate’s campaign.38
FECA’s supporters also saw risk of quid pro quo corruption39 in
independent expenditures (i.e., expenditures made independent of,
and not in coordination with, a campaign).40 Thus, FECA also imposed
limits on the independent expenditures that could be made “relative
41
to a clearly identified candidate.”
The constitutionality of FECA’s contribution and independent
42
expenditure limitations was first challenged in Buckley v. Valeo. In
that case, the Court held that the government had a compelling
interest in preventing actual and apparent quid pro quo corruption in
federal elections.43 It then held that FECA’s contribution limitations
were constitutional because they furthered that interest without
34. 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A) (West 2009).
35. Id. Because the theatre and DVD distributions of Hillary did not meet the definition of
electioneering communication, the FEC could not criminalize their distribution.
36. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (West 2009)).
37. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2) (West 2009).
38. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
39. Quid pro quo refers to politicians inappropriately rewarding significant political
supporters with political favors.
40. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 (addressing Congress’s contention that independent
expenditures pose a quid pro quo corruption threat).
41. Id. at 39 (discussing FECA § 608(e)(1), amended by 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2) (West
2009)).
42. Buckley, 424 U.S.
43. Id. at 26–27.
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unnecessarily abridging the associational freedoms of contributors or
otherwise limiting their speech.44
In contrast, the Buckley Court held FECA’s independent
45
expenditure restrictions unconstitutional. Applying strict scrutiny,
the Court first noted that the language in FECA’s independent
expenditure provision—”relative to a clearly identified candidate”—
46
was impermissibly vague. To make the language clear, the Court
construed it narrowly to cover only expenditures that funded express
advocacy (i.e., advocacy employing words that specifically advocate
the election or defeat of a candidate, such as “vote for,” “support,”
“defeat,” etc.).47 But even after narrowing the language, the Court
struck down FECA’s independent expenditure provisions based on its
reasoning that independent expenditures, unlike direct contributions,
did not pose a threat of quid pro quo corruption.48 Thus, FECA’s
independent expenditure limitations failed to advance the
government’s compelling interest in avoiding actual or apparent quid
pro quo corruption in elections.49
Two years after Buckley, the Court confirmed that independent
expenditures could not be constitutionally restricted, even if those
expenditures were made by corporations rather than individuals. In
50
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court held that First
Amendment protections remain in force even if the speaker is a
51
corporation. Further, it held that the threat of wealthy corporations
“drown[ing] out other points of view” could not justify suppressing
52
corporate speech. The Court held that corporate speech was no less
valuable to the democratic process than speech from other sources,

44. Id. at 28. The Court did not subject FECA’s direct contribution limitations to a strict
scrutiny standard because they imposed only “marginal restriction[s]” on donors’ abilities to
engage in political speech; though limiting what a donor could give to a particular candidate,
they otherwise left donors free to engage in unlimited, independent political advocacy. Id. at 20–
21. The court applied a lower level of scrutiny to FECA’s direct contribution limitations without
identifying the level of scrutiny used. Id. at 25.
45. Id. at 41. The Court held that FECA’s independent expenditure restrictions were
subject to strict scrutiny, because they limited the amount of expression individuals and
organizations could engage in relative to a given candidate. Id. at 44–45.
46. Id. at 43–44.
47. Id. at 44.
48. Id. at 46–47.
49. Id. at 47–48.
50. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
51. Id. at 776–77.
52. Id. at 789.
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stating that “[t]he inherent worth of the speech . . . does not depend
upon the identity of its source.”53
54
Ten years later, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the
Court effectively reversed the position it took in Bellotti. In Austin the
Court permitted the regulation of independent corporate
expenditures, without overruling Bellotti, based on a newly-identified
form of corruption that, according to the Court, the government had a
compelling interest in reducing.55 The Austin Court described this
newly-identified form of corruption as “the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to
the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”56 Essentially,
the Austin Court believed that corporate resources raised through
business operations, selling shares, and borrowing are otherwise much
larger than if raised through donations seeking to advance a
particular political message and that this gives an unfair political
advantage to corporate ideas.57 The Court ruled this way despite its
holding in Bellotti that corporate speech enjoyed the same First
58
Amendment protections as individual speech.
Importantly, in Austin and every campaign-finance case before it,
the Court only addressed laws that restricted independent corporate
59
expenditures made for express advocacy. After Austin, corporations
continued to make large independent expenditures simply by
avoiding the “magic words” of express advocacy.60 Corporate ads
would refer to federal candidates by name without expressly calling
61
for their election or defeat. Most of these ads were scripted as “issue
ads” that raised a political issue and then referred to a candidate’s
62
position on that issue.

53. Id. at 776–77.
54. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
55. Id. at 660.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 658–59.
58. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776–77.
59. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2679 (2007) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that speech regulation from
Buckley to Austin was limited to express advocacy).
60. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n (McConnell I), 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 527 (D.D.C.
2003).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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By 2002, the number of independent corporate issue ads had risen
substantially.63 Congress considered this problematic, and accordingly
enacted the BCRA—with its definition of “electioneering
communications”—to “stanch” the “flow of [corporate] money”
funding the issue ads appearing before federal elections.64 In its
definition of “electioneering communications,” the BCRA disposed of
the distinctions between express advocacy ads and issue ads and
simply prohibited any corporate-funded ads that referred to a federal
candidate within thirty days of a primary election or sixty days of a
65
general election.
Immediately after the BCRA was enacted it was challenged. In
66
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, multiple plaintiffs
asserted that section 203 was an unconstitutional speech restriction
because the “electioneering communications” that section 203
prohibited extended beyond express advocacy.67 But the Court upheld
section 203 as facially constitutional, reasoning that the justifications
for regulating independent corporate expenditures constituting
express advocacy “apply equally” to ads that are “the functional
68
equivalent of express advocacy.” The Court believed that the
regulation of such expenditures was acceptable because they could
have the kind of “corrosive and distorting effect” on the electorate
recognized in Austin and because the government had a compelling
interest in countering those effects.69
Though the Supreme Court did not elaborate on the point, the
district court in McConnell had found that the BCRA targeted only
broadcast ads because those ads are the most effective form of
communicating an electioneering message and therefore posed the
70
greatest risk of corruption. The district court noted that forms of

63. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2694–95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
64. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n (McConnell II), 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003).
65. 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A). Also, the BCRA applies to nearly all corporations, including
non-profit advocacy corporations that receive any portion of their funding from for-profit
corporations. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.10 (exempting only ideological, nonprofit, membership
corporations that do not accept funding from for-profit corporations from the BCRA).
Congress apparently designed the BCRA in this way to ensure that for-profit corporations
could not avoid the law by simply funneling money through a nonprofit advocacy corporation.
66. McConnell II, 540 U.S.
67. Id. at 205–06.
68. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 205.
70. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n (McConnell I), 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 569–71
(D.D.C. 2003).
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media that required viewers to “opt-in” or “make a choice to . . .
watch the program”71 would mostly reach voters already predisposed
to those views and would reach far fewer undecided voters than a
72
broadcast ad. For the McConnell district court, this was a “critical
distinction” that separated communications that posed a great risk of
corruption (broadcast ads) from those that did not (viewer choice
73
media).
Though finding section 203 facially constitutional, the Supreme
Court noted that future as-applied challenges to section 203 may
74
nonetheless succeed. The first as-applied challenge came four years
later in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
(“WRTL”).75 In WRTL, the Court fragmented into three lines of
reasoning. Each of the three fragments must be considered because
each is important to an analysis and prediction of what may happen in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
A. Fragment 1
The lead opinion in WRTL was authored by Chief Justice Roberts
and joined by Justice Alito. Justice Roberts accepted McConnell’s
holding that section 203 could constitutionally prohibit ads that were
the functional equivalent of express advocacy.76 In addition, Justice
Roberts held that “a court should find that an ad is the functional
equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate.”77 Justice Roberts reasoned that this must
be an objective test that focuses on the ad’s substance and not on
contextual factors that might illustrate the corporation’s reasons for
running the ad.78 Applying this test, Justice Roberts reasoned that
Wisconsin Right to Life’s ads were not the functional equivalent of
express advocacy because they took a position on a legislative issue

71. Id. at 571.
72. Id. at 646; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 24–25.
73. Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 24–25.
74. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 546 U.S. 410, 411–12 (2006). The
Supreme Court confirmed in this case that in holding section 203 facially constitutional
McConnell still permitted future as-applied challenges to section 203.
75. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
76. Id. at 2664 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion).
77. Id. at 2667.
78. Id. at 2666.
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and urged the public to contact their representatives about it.79
Moreover, they neither “mention[ed] an election, candidacy, political
party, or challenger” nor “[took] a position on a candidate’s character,
80
qualifications, or fitness for office.”
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy disagreed with Justice
Roberts’s functional equivalency test but concurred in the judgment
that section 203 was unconstitutional as applied to Wisconsin Right to
Life’s ads. This gave authoritative weight to Justice Roberts’s test
based on the principle that “when a fragmented Court decides a case
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
81
grounds.” After WRTL, the FEC promulgated federal regulations
that implemented Justice Roberts’s formulation.82
There is one other important aspect of Justice Roberts’s opinion.
WRTL had argued that even if the for-profit, corporate-funded
advertisements in Austin threatened to corrupt the electoral process
because the advertisements might not reflect the actual views of
shareholders, nonprofit advocacy-group-funded advertisements did
not pose such a threat because those advertisements wholly-reflect
83
the views of the nonprofit’s members. Justice Roberts declined to
address this argument because Wisconsin Right to Life had received
84
some of its funding from for-profit corporations.
B. Fragment 2
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justices
Thomas and Kennedy. Justice Scalia argued that McConnell was
incorrect insofar as it had held that section 203 could constitutionally
prohibit the functional equivalent of express advocacy.85 He believed
that any test to determine what constitutes the functional equivalent
of express advocacy would be too vague in application to justify

79. Id.
80. Id. at 2667.
81. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278 n.10 (D.D.C. 2008)
(quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). Citizens United and the FEC agreed
in district court that Justice Roberts’s formulation was the “governing test for the functional
equivalent of express advocacy.” Id.
82. 11 C.F.R. § 114.15 (2007).
83. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 n.10 (2007).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2684 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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McConnell’s holding that section 203 is facially constitutional, but that
section 203 could be challenged, without vagueness concerns, on an
as-applied basis.86 He argued the necessary uncertainty of any
functional equivalency test would fail to distinguish between issue ads
and campaign ads disguised as issue ads, thereby improperly
restricting many genuine issue ads.87 Justice Scalia believed the
express advocacy test of Buckley should define the limits of section
203 because it is the only test that provides certainty without
unconstitutionally chilling political speech, even if it allows many
88
advocacy ads disguised as issue ads to be broadcast.
Justice Scalia also believed that Austin was an indefensible
89
departure from Buckley and Bellotti and that it should be overruled.
He would return the law to the point where speech bans were not
permitted in the independent expenditure arena at all, even if they
are corporate expenditures paying for express advocacy ads.90
C. Fragment 3
Justice Souter dissented and was joined by Justices Ginsberg,
Stevens, and Breyer. Justice Souter agreed that section 203 could
prohibit issue ads that are the functional equivalent of express
advocacy but disagreed with Justice Roberts about the proper test for
functional equivalency.91 Justice Souter argued that the test should be
the converse of Justice Roberts’s test: anything that could conceivably
be construed as a call to vote for or against a candidate should be
deemed the functional equivalent of express advocacy.92 He believed
that Justice Roberts’s test effectively overruled McConnell by
returning the law to a state that proscribes only express advocacy ads,
because most ads without the “magic words” could be reasonably
construed as something other than the functional equivalent of
express advocacy.93
The Court did not consider the application of section 203 to a
feature-length political documentary such as Hillary, nor has it done

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 2683–84.
Id. at 2684.
Id.
Id. at 2679.
Id. at 2686.
Id. at 2698 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2699.
Id.
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so in any case to date. The broadcast advertising considered by the
Court in WRTL and other cases has been traditional ten-second to
thirty-second ads run during regular programming.
IV. HOLDING
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the district
court first held that the VOD distribution of Hillary qualified as an
electioneering communication under the BCRA because it would be
communicated via a cable system within thirty days of several
Democratic presidential primaries and plainly referred to thenpresidential candidate Hillary Clinton.94 Next, the district court
recognized that BCRA section 203 prohibited corporations from
funding electioneering communications out of their general treasury
funds.95 Because Hillary was so funded, section 203 prohibited its
VOD distribution during the thirty-day period before any Democratic
96
primary.
Turning to the constitutionality of section 203, the district court
recognized that the McConnell decision upheld section 203 as facially
constitutional insofar as it prohibited ads that constituted express
advocacy or the functional equivalent thereof, something to be
97
decided on an as-applied basis. The district court, however, did not
consider Hillary to be express advocacy.98 As a result, whether
Citizens’s as-applied challenge would prevail depended on whether
99
Hillary was the functional equivalent of express advocacy. The
parties agreed that the “governing law” for the functional equivalent
of express advocacy was Justice Roberts’s test in WRTL.100
Applying Justice Roberts’s WRTL test, the district court ruled
that Hillary was the functional equivalent of express advocacy
because it could not be interpreted as anything other than an appeal
to defeat Hillary Clinton.101 In making this conclusion, the district

94. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n (Citizens United I), 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277
n.6 (D.D.C. 2008).
95. Id. at 277.
96. Id. at 280.
97. Id. at 278.
98. See id. at 278–80 (the district court’s analysis focused solely on whether Hillary was the
functional equivalent of express advocacy, which would have been unnecessary had the court
considered Hillary express advocacy).
99. Id. at 278–79.
100. Id. at 277 n.6.
101. Id. at 279–80.
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court observed that Hillary focuses very little on current legislative
issues; makes repeated references to the presidential election and
Hillary Clinton’s candidacy; and takes a position on her character,
102
qualifications, and fitness for the office of president. The district
court cited many of the film’s negative comments about Hillary
Clinton to demonstrate that, on the whole, the film is an appeal to
103
defeat her. Accordingly, the district court ruled that Hillary could be
constitutionally prohibited by BCRA section 203.104
V. ANALYSIS
“The first instinct of power is the retention of power, and, under a
Constitution that requires periodic elections, that is best achieved
105
by the suppression of election-time speech.”

The text of the First Amendment is worth remembering, even
though it has played a minor role in the Supreme Court’s analysis of
the cases that have influenced the interpretation of BCRA section
203:“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”106 Even if one concedes that the Supreme Court cannot
always interpret the First Amendment in an absolute sense, any
speech restrictions the Court upholds must be supported by a
compelling interest.107 A statutory ban on ads that criticize incumbent
or would-be elected officials hardly seems compelling. In fact, the
founders likely had a mind to prevent such laws when they inscribed
the words “no law” on parchment in the Bill of Rights.108 The district
102. Id.
103. Id. at 280 n.12. For example, here are two of approximately twelve quotes cited by the
district court: (1) “She is steeped in controversy, steeped in sleaze, that's why they don't want us
to look at her record.” (2) “I mean think of what it says about Hillary Clinton that she was
willing to put up with his open philandering, with anything in a skirt who wanders before his
eyesight all for the power—at least with Bill Clinton he was just good time Charlie. Hillary’s got
an agenda and she’s willing to put up with that to be [P]resident of the [U]nited [S]tates, she's
got a to do list when she gets to the White House.”
104. Id.
105. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
107. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (“[T]he [judicial]
presumption of constitutionality [is narrow] when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first Ten Amendments . . . .”).
108. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–1800 28 (Richmond, J.W.
Randolph 1850) (“The right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free
communication among the people thereon . . . has ever been justly deemed the only effectual
guardian of every other right.”); JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 456 (Boston,
Little, Brown, and Co. 1865) (“[L]iberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge
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court, however, was not at liberty to consider such first principles
because precedent had long papered over the First Amendment’s
foundational text.
According to the district court, precedent required consideration
of a single issue to determine the constitutionality of section 203 as
applied to Hillary: whether the film is the functional equivalent of
express advocacy under Justice Roberts’s Federal Election
Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. test.109 The district court
held that it was because the film clearly mentions Hillary’s
presidential candidacy, takes a position on her character and
qualifications to be president, and does not focus primarily on
legislative issues.110
Though the district court was correct about much of Hillary’s
content, it may have been incorrect that Hillary was the functional
equivalent of express advocacy because Justice Roberts’s WRTL
factors were used to analyze thirty-second advertisements, not
feature-length films. A thirty-second advertisement that mentioned
Clinton’s presidential candidacy and then attacked her presidential
character and qualifications would leave little time for much else.
Such an ad could only be interpreted as an appeal not to vote for
Hillary Clinton. But Hillary is a ninety-minute film that, in addition to
the content recognized by the district court, also contains a great deal
of biographical information about Clinton’s political career and
discusses the positions she takes on current political issues.111 The film
could be interpreted as something other than the functional
equivalent of express advocacy. For example, it could be viewed as a
critical biography of a prominent politician or as an entertainment
112
piece for political aficionados.
Under Justice Roberts’s test, Citizens’s desire to broadcast the
film during an election cycle is irrelevant because this desire is a
contextual factor that focuses on Citizens’s intent in producing the
113
film.

among the people, who have a right . . . and a desire to know; but besides this, they have a right,
an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to that most dreaded and envied kind of
knowledge, I mean, of the characters and conduct of their rulers.”).
109. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 278–79.
110. Id. at 12.
111. Id. at 40.
112. Id.
113. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 (2007).
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This case might illustrate that Justice Scalia was right to believe
that any test for the functional equivalent of express advocacy would
often be too difficult to apply in practice.114 Conversely, this case might
illustrate that Justice Souter was correct to believe that very few nonexpress advocacy communications will be prohibited by section 203
because most applications of Justice Roberts’s test will find other
115
reasonable interpretations of a given communication. But the case
is most likely to demonstrate that while short, political advertisements
should be deemed the functional equivalent of express advocacy
when the factors of Justice Roberts’s WRTL test are present, similar
functional equivalency concerns are not necessarily present with
feature-length films. Feature-length films that contain the WRTL
factors have plenty of room for other substantive material that could
lead a reasonable viewer to interpret the film as something other than
the functional equivalent of express advocacy.
The WRTL functional equivalency test ultimately assesses
whether a given communication poses a risk of corruption to the
election process so great that Congress is compelled to regulate it.116
Accordingly, when applying the WRTL test to Hillary, the district
court should have considered whether Hillary posed any risk of
corruption to federal elections.
The fact that accessing Hillary required viewer choice is vital to
this inquiry.117 Viewers had to affirmatively elect to watch Hillary by
ordering it on a VOD service.118 Even if the government has a
compelling interest in regulating short campaign ads thrust upon the
masses during prime-time programming, it does not follow that the
government has an interest in prohibiting people from voluntarily
deciding to invest ninety minutes to see what a political advocacy
group has to say about a candidate.119 The threat of amassed corporate
wealth distorting the views of the electorate is not as great when the
segment of the electorate that views the communication is selfselecting.

114. Id. at 2683–84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
115. Id. at 2699 (Souter, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 2672.
117. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 569–71 (D.D.C. 2003); Brief
for Appellant, supra note 17, at 25–26.
118. Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 25–26.
119. McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
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Admittedly, the BCRA does not distinguish between full-length
feature films and thirty-second ads in its definition of “electioneering
communications.” Nor does it recognize an exception to
“electioneering communications” based on viewer choice. But neither
lack of distinction nor lack of an exception in the statute should
matter because every application of a statute that restricts speech
must further a compelling interest.120 The government does not have a
compelling interest in suppressing a film like Hillary. And even if it
did, the BCRA is underinclusive because it only prohibits the VOD
distribution of Hillary and does not prohibit the internet download of
Hillary or the selling of Hillary DVDs.121 How this selective restriction
of speech furthers a government interest is unclear.
Citizens makes two additional arguments on appeal that the Court
will likely address. First, Citizens argues that the reasoning in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce does not apply because the funding
for Hillary came predominantly from individual donors and therefore
reflects the level of popular support for the views expressed in
Hillary.122 This argument will likely be dismissed by the Court, as it
was in WRTL, because there are insufficient facts on the record to
know what percentage of general funding came from for-profit
corporations.123
Citizens also argues that Austin is inconsistent with Buckley v.
Valeo and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti and should be
overruled.124 This argument is unlikely to be successful because only
125
three of the justices agree. In addition, overruling Austin would
invalidate McConnell v. Federal Election Commission and much of the
BCRA because it would prohibit Congress from regulating
independent corporate expenditures altogether.126 Though this
outcome would be more in harmony with the First Amendment’s “no
law” injunction than existing precedent, there simply are not enough
votes on the Court to overrule Austin.

120. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2671.
121. Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 27–28.
122. Id. at 29–30.
123. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 26, at 30.
124. Brief for Appellant, supra note 17, at 30–31.
125. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“Austin . . . was wrongly decided.”). Justice Scalia was joined in this opinion by Justices
Kennedy and Thomas.
126. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 26, at 34–35.
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VI. DISPOSITION/CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito will likely apply the
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. to
feature-length films, but make it clear that feature-length films
containing the WRTL factors (mentioning an election, taking a
position on a candidate’s character, etc.) may nevertheless be
interpreted as something other than the functional equivalent of
express advocacy depending on the film’s substantive content. They
may even develop additional factors to consider when applying the
WRTL test to feature-length films. The Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce concern that corporate wealth could corrupt the
electoral process will be tantamount to their analysis. They will likely
hold that where there is a self-selecting audience, corruption of the
electoral process is less of a risk and therefore the government would
not further a compelling interest by banning the film.
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy will probably concur in the
judgment but continue to maintain that McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission and Austin should be overruled, which would free all
independent corporate expenditures from speech restrictions and
make the VOD broadcast of Hillary prima facia acceptable.
If a 5-4 majority results, Justices Roberts and Alito will be the
authors of the leading opinion and their judgment will be the law for
applying BCRA section 203 to films like Hillary. It is hard to predict
how Justices Souter, Ginsberg, Stevens, and Breyer will vote. They are
generally favorable to the restrictions imposed by BCRA section
127
203, but they may be persuaded that the element of viewer choice
changes the calculus by eliminating or reducing the interest the
government has in restricting such speech.
In any event, Citizens will likely prevail in the Supreme Court,
freeing it and similar groups—on both sides of the political
spectrum—to produce and distribute films like Hillary to selfselecting audiences during future pre-election periods. This would be
a desirable result because there are plenty of biographical targets in
Washington whose political merit and professional credentials, or lack
thereof, should not be shielded by campaign finance laws that
derogate the First Amendment.

127. All four justices voted to uphold section 203 in WRTL. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127
S. Ct. at 2687 (Souter, J., dissenting).

